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Abstract 
Objective: We propose that the experience of state authenticity – the subjective sense of being 
one’s true self – ought to be considered separately from trait authenticity as well as from 
prescriptions regarding what should make people feel authentic. Methods: In Study 1 (N = 104), 
participants rated the frequency of and motivation for experiences of authenticity and 
inauthenticity. Studies 2 (N = 268) and 3 (N = 93) asked participants to describe their 
experiences of authenticity or inauthenticity. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 also completed 
measures of trait authenticity, and participants in Study 3 rated their experience with respect to 
several phenomenological dimensions. Results: Study 1 demonstrated that people are motivated 
to experience state authenticity and avoid inauthenticity and that such experiences are common, 
regardless of one's degree of trait authenticity. Coding of Study 2's narratives identified the 
emotions accompanying and needs fulfilled in each state. Trait authenticity generally did not 
qualify the nature of (in)authentic experiences. Study 3 corroborated the results of Study 2 and 
further revealed positive mood and nostalgia as consequences of reflecting on experiences of 
authenticity. Conclusions: We discuss implications of these findings for conceptualizations of 
authenticity and the self. 
 
 
 
Keywords: state authenticity, self, autobiographical narratives, affect and emotion, need 
satisfaction.  
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Authenticity is a prevalent concept in popular culture, with people either striving to attain 
it or claiming to possess it (Rosenbloom, 2011). But what does it mean to feel true, real, and 
authentic? Most empirical work views authenticity from a trait perspective. Accordingly, 
participants in such studies report the degree to which they generally feel, think, and behave in 
line with a set of criteria supposedly indicative of authenticity (Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Wood, 
Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008). For example, participants have rated the extent to 
which their behavior usually expresses their values (Kernis & Goldman, 2006) and whether they 
usually do as others prefer (Wood et al., 2008). These studies demonstrate that trait authenticity 
is associated with greater life satisfaction and self-esteem (Goldman & Kernis, 2002), increased 
subjective well-being and decreased stress (Wood et al., 2008), and higher mindfulness and 
lesser verbal defensiveness (Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, & Lance, 2008).  
State authenticity as a construct is far less understood. This is due to lack of definitional 
clarity (Erickson, 1995; Harter, 2002; Heppner et al., 2008) and of conceptual development from 
relevant theoretical perspectives (self-determination theory: Deci & Ryan, 2000; sociometer 
theory: Leary, 1999). Our overarching aim is to improve understanding of state authenticity by 
considering it in its own right.  
Traits and States 
We draw on previous distinctions between traits and states (Fleeson, 2001; Nezleck, 
2007). A trait is a person’s base-rate propensity toward (or away from) a set of cognitions, 
emotions, or actions; a state is the actual set of cognitions, emotions, or actions in a particular 
situation (Endler, Parker, Bagby, & Cox, 1991). Traits and states are further distinguishable with 
respect to: (a) their duration (states are shorter-lived); (b) the degree to which they are 
continuous in nature (a given episode of a state manifests relatively continuously, whereas traits 
are less uniform across time); and (c) the extent to which they are abstract entities and, thus, 
necessitate inference rather than direct experience to discern (traits are more abstract than states; 
Fridhandler, 1986). Attesting to the validity of these distinctions, traits can be predicted from a 
sample of state episodes but not from a single state episode (Nezlek, 2007).  
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Our studies assessed the experiential aspect of state authenticity, adopting the view that 
“if a person is in a state he or she must be able to feel it” (Fridhandler, 1986, p. 170). This 
subjective sense of authenticity is believed to be important, because it helps to maintain and 
facilitate self-coherence. In other words, it tells people whether they are integrated and organized 
(Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 1997). For example, felt authenticity may signal that 
one’s values have been upheld, whereas felt inauthenticity may signal that one’s values have 
been undermined (Erickson, 1995). Individuals who lack a stable sense of self – as may be 
indicated by a sense of inauthenticity – risk their well-being (Ritchie, Sedikides, Wildschut, 
Arndt, & Gidron, 2011; Sedikides, Wildschut, Gaertner, Routledge, & Arndt, 2008; Stephan, 
Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012). Furthermore, if authenticity is indeed an idealized state that 
anyone can and should experience (Maslow, 1971; Rogers, 1961), it is crucial to know how 
people recognize its attainment. 
Trait Authenticity 
Trait perspectives – which owe much to humanistic constructs such as “self-
actualization” (Maslow, 1971) and the “fully functioning person” (Rogers, 1961) – conceive of 
authenticity as a disposition toward self-congruent behavior. Or as Maslow put it, “authenticity is 
the reduction of phoniness toward the zero point” (p. 183). According to Kernis and Goldman 
(2006), for example, the authentic person possesses: Awareness of and motivation to know one’s 
goals, feelings, and self-beliefs, even if contradictory; Unbiased Processing of one’s attributes, 
emotions, experiences and knowledge; Behavior in accord with one’s personal needs, desires, 
and values; and a Relational Orientation toward honesty and openness with others.  
A more recent trait-based approach to authenticity — we label it the Authentic 
Personality model — posits that, to be authentic, one’s actions must align with the personal 
values, preferences, beliefs, and motivations of which one is aware (Wood et al., 2008). This 
idea is expressed by the model’s Authentic Living facet. Also, an authentic person is someone 
who does not Accept External Influence. The third facet, Self-Alienation, is the only one that 
addresses how inauthenticity might feel to the person experiencing it, with this feeling resulting 
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from failures in the other two domains. Excluding the notion of self-alienation, both models 
(Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Wood et al.) contain clear prescriptions regarding the achievement of 
authenticity (e.g., behaving in accord with one’s desires and values, rejecting external influence). 
State Authenticity 
Similarly, accounts of state authenticity propose that people are authentic in a situation 
only if there is a match between their enduring propensities (e.g., attitudes, values, beliefs, 
personality) and their cognitions or actions in that situation. For example, the self-concordance 
model (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998) suggests that people are self-concordant (i.e., authentic) if there 
is a fit between their situational goal strivings and their personal values. Other accounts conceive 
of state authenticity in terms of momentary access to the self system. According to personality 
systems interaction theory (Kuhl, 2000), the self-system comprises implicit representations of 
one’s feelings, needs, and goals. Self-infiltration of another person’s goals, for example, is 
deemed inauthentic because it is indicative of inadequate access to the self-system (Baumann & 
Kuhl, 2003). Bargh and colleagues (Bargh, McKenna, Fitzsimons, 2002; see also Schlegel, 
Hicks, Arndt, & King, 2008) likewise posit that access to the true self affords authenticity. By 
and large, state authenticity has been operationalized similarly to trait authenticity: as value- or 
trait-behavior consistency, self-awareness, and rejection of others’ influence.  
Others have proposed, however, that state authenticity is better understood as a 
phenomenological experience, which may manifest itself as "psychological tension" when 
thwarted (Harter, 2002; p. 383). Similarly, Erickson (1995) argued that emotions are central to 
the experience of authenticity: The self is more a felt experience than a cognitive evaluation. 
Theorists from the humanistic tradition suggest that emotions are central to authenticity, because 
a feeling of authenticity signals to the individual that the self is integrated and organized 
(Sheldon et al., 1997). Indeed, the subjective sense of authenticity is a better predictor of well-
being than is cross-role personality consistency (Sheldon et al.). So what is known about the 
conditions under which authenticity is subjectively experienced?  
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The state-content significance hypothesis holds that some ways of acting feel more 
authentic due to characteristics of the actions themselves rather than due to whether these actions 
reflect the person's traits (Fleeson and Wilt, 2010). Supporting this hypothesis, Fleeson and 
Wilt's results showed that people felt more authentic when behaving in an extraverted, agreeable, 
open, and conscientious way, even when those people were not dispositionally extraverted, 
agreeable, open, or conscientious. There are two related but distinct explanations for these 
findings. The first emphasizes the social normativeness of the authenticity-inducing personality 
profile. Sherman, Nave, and Funder (2012) reported that the typical person is more extraverted 
than introverted, more agreeable than disagreeable, etc. Therefore, irrespective of their actual 
personality traits, people may feel most authentic “when they manage to act in a normative and 
[...] psychologically well-adjusted manner” (p. 88). The second explanation picks up from the 
latter point regarding psychological adjustment. In particular, people may feel authentic not 
because they are conforming to social norms, but rather because they are conforming to their 
own ideal selves. Research on gender stereotypes shows that integration of social norms into the 
ideal self can yield higher levels of perceived congruence between actual and ideal selves 
(Wood, Christensen, Hebl, & Rothgerber, 1997). 
Another relevant research area relating to when people experience state (in)authenticity 
concerns emotional labor. Hochschild (1983) observed that some people are required to manage 
the expression, if not the experience, of their emotions as part of their job duties (e.g., “service 
with a smile”). As a result, employees may come to feel alienated from their own emotions and, 
thus, inauthentic ("emotive dissonance"; Hochschild,  p. 90). However, it is not emotion 
regulation per se that leads to inauthenticity but, rather, it is emotion regulation coupled with the 
belief that one's job requires one to be good at "handling" people (Wharton, 1999). Thus, 
external pressure (lack of autonomy), not merely a discrepancy between feelings and behavior, 
may be critical for the subjective experience of inauthenticity.  
Self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000) explicitly 
speaks to the role of satisfaction of the need for autonomy (i.e., the need to organize one’s own 
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experience and behavior so that they accord with one’s sense of self) in state authenticity. 
Satisfaction of autonomy plus two other needs is considered paramount: competence (i.e., the 
need to feel capable and effective in bringing about desired outcomes) and relatedness (i.e., the 
need for connection with and love for and by others). This is because satisfaction of all three 
needs facilitates goal internalization, and goal internalization is a presumed precondition for 
authenticity (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998). Cognitive evaluation theory, a derivative of SDT (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000), proposes that autonomy and competence (together with an internal “locus of 
causality” for the particular competence, p. 70) are especially potent in producing authenticity. 
There is, however, little research in direct support of these hypotheses. The one exception is a 
diary study demonstrating that daily variability in satisfaction of autonomy, relatedness, and 
competence needs correlated positively with felt authenticity (Heppner et al., 2008).  
Similarly, there is little evidence, other than this diary study, that bears upon Leary’s 
(2003) proposal that satisfaction of relational needs plays a pivotal role in the experience of 
authenticity. According to this contention, people who gain acceptance by behaving according to 
their natural inclinations will feel authentic, whereas people who go against their natural 
inclinations to gain social approval will feel inauthentic. Thus, authenticity is thought to result 
from the joint satisfaction of autonomy and relatedness needs. Supporting this contention, albeit 
indirectly, research indicates that people are more likely to feel authentic in the company of 
friends (Sheldon et al., 1997; Turner & Billings, 1991). Given the intimate links between social 
approval and self-esteem (sociometer theory; Leary, 1999), one might further predict that it is the 
specific conjunction of feelings of high relatedness, autonomy, and self-esteem that contributes 
to the sense of authenticity. Again, only Heppner et al.’s (2008) diary study addresses this 
prediction: It revealed a correlation between daily variability in self-esteem and felt authenticity. 
Questions remain, however: Does the feeling that one’s needs have been satisfied indeed 
coincide or with or even cause the experience of authenticity and, if so, which needs are 
especially relevant? 
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In the only study that has considered adults’ subjective experience of state authenticity 
more broadly (Turner & Billings, 1991), university undergraduates in 1973 wrote about an 
occasion in which their true self had been expressed and an occasion in which their feelings or 
actions contradicted their true self. The researchers examined the narratives' content for 
experiential features of the situation (e.g., “emotional ambience”, p. 106). Authentic-self 
situations were characterized by an atmosphere of acceptance and sympathy, of being on a break 
or holiday, and of openness. Inauthentic-self situations had an atmosphere of superficial 
sociability and awkwardness. Overall, true-self situations possessed a more positive emotional 
ambience than false-self situations. This conclusion is similar to one drawn by Rice and 
Pasupathi (2010), who elicited descriptions and emotion-ratings of an event that was either 
consistent or discrepant with participants’ sense of self. Self-consistent events contained more 
positive than negative emotions (for older adults only), whereas self-discrepant events contained 
more negative than positive emotions. While such conclusions seem evident, researchers have 
yet to identify the specific emotions that are associated with the subjective experience of 
authenticity (or inauthenticity). Harter’s (2002) notion of psychological tension suggests that 
anxiety may be a key feature of inauthenticity, but it is unknown whether there are other 
negatively-valenced emotions associated with this state and, further, which specific emotions 
characterize the experience of authenticity. 
Impetus for Our Research 
Our research examined people’s accounts of the subjective experience of state 
authenticity in order to test the proposition that state authenticity can be empirically and 
theoretically distinguished from trait authenticity. This approach to state authenticity is 
warranted, because the available conceptual definitions are disjointed. As Rozin (2009) argued, it 
is vital that researchers undertake a careful inspection and possess a clear understanding of a 
phenomenon’s properties before they set upon hypothesis testing. Accordingly, gaining an 
understanding of state authenticity, as it is subjectively experienced, will provide a solid basis 
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upon which to build a more comprehensive and ecologically valid account of authenticity in all 
of its forms.  
We proceeded as follows. The first study assessed the frequency with which people 
experience authenticity and the strength of their motivations to achieve it or, in the case of 
inauthenticity, avoid it. Studies 2 and 3 examined the experience of state authenticity by 
considering the content of people’s narratives describing situations in which they felt either 
authentic or inauthentic. Study 2 additionally tested whether trait authenticity moderates the 
experience of state (in)authenticity and Study 3 investigated participants' phenomenological 
perceptions of these events.  
STUDY 1 
We gauged the frequency of and motivation for experiences of authenticity and 
inauthenticity. Only if state authenticity is a frequent and significant experience will the 
elicitation of individual descriptions thereof be of theoretical and practical importance. After 
responding to a survey on the role of (in)authenticity in their lives, participants completed a 
measure of trait authenticity. Thus, this study also provided an initial assessment of state 
authenticity’s discriminant validity from trait authenticity. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 104 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a website offering 
paid online tasks. MTurk participants are generally more representative of the American public 
than are standard internet and university samples; importantly, results of studies conducted via 
MTurk are consistent with studies conducted in more traditional ways (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2010; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Participants, who 
received $0.40 (n = 85) or $0.50 (n = 19), were 66 women and 38 men between 18 and 77 years 
of age (M = 35.3, SD = 12.99). The majority were from the United States (99%) and native 
English speakers (89.4%; otherwise, they reported being either mostly or perfectly fluent).  
Materials and Procedure 
RUNNING HEAD: State Authenticity         10 
 
The first part of the survey included 12 items assessing the frequency of experiences of 
authenticity and inauthenticity and strength of motivation to experience authenticity or avoid 
inauthenticity. To assess frequency, we asked participants: (a) whether (yes vs. no) they had ever 
experienced (in)authenticity; (b) to rate the general frequency of (in)authenticity's occurrence (1 
= very rarely, 7 = very frequently); and (c) to make a more concrete frequency estimation (1 = 
never, 10 = at least once a day, with relevant labels in between). To assess motivation, 
participants indicated: (a) how much they value attaining authenticity (or avoiding inauthenticity; 
1= not at all, 7 = very much); (b) how important it is that they experience authenticity (or avoid 
inauthenticity; 1= not at all, 7 = very much); and (c) how much effort they put into experiencing 
authenticity (or avoiding inauthenticity; 1= none at all, 7 = the most possible). Participants 
received broad, experience-focused definitions of the critical terms: (a) “According to 
psychologists, the sense of authenticity is defined as ‘the sense or feeling that you are in 
alignment with your true, genuine self.’ In other words, the sense of authenticity is the feeling 
that you are being your real self.”; (b) “According to psychologists, the sense of inauthenticity is 
defined as ‘the sense or feeling that you are in alignment with an untrue, false self.’ In other 
words, the sense of inauthenticity is the feeling that you are not being your real self.” 
Note that these definitions prescribed neither why these feelings arise nor the particular 
nature of the feelings (e.g., in terms of emotional content or intensity). Next, participants 
completed the Authentic Personality scale (AP; Wood et al., 2008; α = .89). Finally, participants 
responded to demographic questions.  
Results and Discussion 
Frequency of Experience  
Most participants had experienced authenticity (94.2%) and inauthenticity (91.3%). The 
items assessing general and concrete frequencies were highly correlated for both authenticity and 
inauthenticity (.85 and .87, respectively). We present the mean values for the concrete item, as its 
unambiguous anchors were less susceptible to idiosyncratic interpretation. On average, 
participants reported experiencing authenticity approximately one to two times each week (M = 
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7.38, SD = 2.29) and inauthenticity nearly every two months (M = 4.89, SD = 2.64). Frequencies 
of experienced authenticity and inauthenticity were weakly inversely related (r = -.21, p = .03). 
Motivation for Experience  
We averaged the three items assessing motivation for authenticity (α = .82) and the three 
items assessing motivation to avoid inauthenticity (α = .69). These motivations were strong 
(authenticity seeking: M = 5.83, SD = 1.21; inauthenticity avoidance: M = 5.28, SD = 1.32). The 
composites were also positively and significantly correlated (r = .52, p = .001): As participants’ 
motivation to experience authenticity increased, so did their motivation to avoid inauthenticity. 
Trait versus State Authenticity 
To assess the degree to which trait authenticity accounts for experiences of and motivations 
concerning state authenticity, we examined the simple correlations between trait authenticity and 
each frequency of authenticity (r = .38, p = .001), frequency of inauthenticity (r = -.53, p = .001), 
motivation to experience authenticity (r = .06, p = .573), and motivation to avoid experiencing 
inauthenticity (r = .05, p = .635). Although trait authenticity was a medium-to-large predictor of 
experiences of state (in)authenticity, much variability remained unexplained. Notably, trait 
authenticity did not account for state (in)authenticity motivations.   
Furthermore, these were not extraordinary experiences for either end of the trait 
authenticity spectrum. Among participants low in trait authenticity (up to the 25th percentile), 
88% had experienced both states, which is similar to the percentage of those high in trait 
authenticity (75th percentile or above) who had experienced both states (88.5%). Likewise, there 
were few participants either low (4.0%) or high (3.8%) in trait authenticity who reported never 
having experienced either state. Just 8% of those low in trait authenticity claimed only ever to 
have experienced inauthenticity, and 7.7% of those high in trait authenticity claimed only ever to 
have experienced authenticity. Finally, motivations to experience authenticity and avoid 
inauthenticity were strong for both groups, with ratings between 5.30 and 6.00 on a 7-point scale. 
Summary 
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Experiences of authenticity and inauthenticity are widespread and not fully explained by 
trait authenticity. Having many authentic experiences related only slightly to having fewer 
inauthentic experiences. Also supportive of a distinct state perspective, even participants with the 
lowest levels of trait authenticity reported having experienced authenticity and, conversely, even 
those with the highest levels of trait authenticity had felt inauthentic. Regardless of their trait 
authenticity, people possess strong motivations concerning the experience of both authenticity 
and inauthenticity, attesting to the relevance of these experiences in their lives. 
STUDY 2  
Participants described a time when they felt “most me” or “least me.” In addition to coding 
for the experiential themes, emotions, and needs associated with state (in)authenticity, the study 
explored the relation between real and ideal selves by coding for the narrators’ idealistic self-
portrayals. There are several hints that feeling ideal and real are intertwined. First, and as 
discussed previously, some of the behaviors that elicit the sense of authenticity are also those that 
are socially and psychologically ideal (Fleeson & Wilt, 2010; Sherman et al., 2012). Second, 
experiences that are in line with internalized ideal standards yield high levels of perceived 
overlap between actual and ideal selves (Wood et al., 1997). Third, past research shows that a 
considerable degree of overlap between actual and ideal selves remains despite significant 
differences between their content (Pelham & Swann, 1989). Finally, across a variety of domains, 
people possess positive illusions about themselves (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003, 2008). Thus, 
feeling ideal may contribute to feeling real.  
Study 2 examined our contention that individuals’ predispositions toward authenticity are 
separable from their situational experience of authenticity. We are aware of only two other 
studies that examined the trait-by-state relationship. One indicated that trait authenticity 
moderates state authenticity (Ito & Kodama, 2007): People lower in trait authenticity were more 
likely to experience state authenticity in nonsocial situations, whereas people higher in trait 
authenticity were more likely to experience state authenticity in social situations. The other 
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found no consistent moderation of state authenticity by trait authenticity (Fleeson & Wilt, 2010). 
Neither study, however, focused on the phenomenology of these experiences.  
Method 
Participants 
As part of a class project, University of Edinburgh psychology undergraduates recruited 
273 participants for this study, though five were excluded from data analysis (one for being 
under 18, two for an inappropriate narrative, and two for inadvertently being left out of the 
MTurk codings). The final sample of 268 participants (136 women, 132 men), ranged in age 
from 18 to 76 years (M = 23.46, SD = 10.71), with nearly 90% under 30. No substantive gender 
differences emerged, thus we omitted this variable in the analyses below. Given that age was a 
positive correlate of the Authenticity Inventory (AI; r = .19, p = .03; Kernis & Goldman, 2006), 
we controlled for it in relevant analyses. Age and the AP were uncorrelated (r = .05, p = .62). 
Materials and Procedure 
The paper-and-pencil survey asked half of the participants to describe an event during 
which “you felt most like your true or real self,” and the other half to describe an event during 
which “you felt least like your true or real self.” Participants addressed the location of the event, 
what happened during the event, and who else was there. Supporting the validity of this 
approach, Rice and Pasupathi (2010) demonstrated that events described in self-consistent 
narratives were perceived as more representative, whereas events described in self-inconsistent 
narratives were seen as less representative, of participants’ usual selves. 
Participants next completed either the AI (α = .83) or the AP (α = .81). These trait 
measures were administered after the assessment of state (in)authenticity so that participants 
would write narratives based on their own, unfiltered understanding of what it means to be real 
or true. The manipulation did not affect responses on either measure, ts < |1.0|, ps > .40. The 
survey concluded with demographic questions. 
Coding experiential content. To identify experiential characteristics that coincide with the 
sense of (in)authenticity, we relied on a sample of MTurk raters (N = 281; Mage = 32.23, SDage = 
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11.41; 54.5% female; 90.6% native English speakers; 87.9% with university-level coursework). 
Each rater was randomly assigned to a narrative so that three different individuals rated each 
narrative with respect to four features (raters were paid $0.30 per narrative): (a) themes ─ to 
identify the presence (yes or no) of 17 experiential themes (the list of themes was developed by 
the two senior authors after reading narratives collected from two independent studies; Table 1); 
(b) emotions ─ to indicate whether the narrative provided evidence (yes or no) that the writer 
experienced any of 11 emotion clusters (Table 2), which were selected based on emotion 
prototypes (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987) and select subtype emotions (i.e., 
satisfaction, disappointment, relief, anxiety) related to self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987); 
(c) needs ─ to indicate for each of 10 needs (e.g., “relatedness—where person feels close and 
connected with others”; Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001) whether (yes or no) the “average 
person put into the writer’s/narrator’s ‘shoes’…would feel that the need had been 
fulfilled/satisfied”; and (d) idealistic portrayal ─ to rate the extent to which the writer portrayed 
him/herself in an idealistic way (1 = not at all idealistic, 5 = very idealistic). If at least two 
MTurk raters agreed on a code, we assigned that code to the narrative (for ‘idealistic portrayal,’ 
we averaged the three ratings). Across the binary codings, absolute agreement ─ where all three 
raters assigned the same code (M = 61.89%, SD = 11.96) ─ far exceeded chance levels (12.5%). 
For ‘idealistic portrayal,’ inter-rater agreement also surpassed the odds by a substantial margin 
(e.g., two-rater agreement: 61.2% obtained versus 4.0% odds).  
Results and Discussion 
Experiential Content 
The average Spearman correlation among the experiential themes was low (rs = .16, SD = 
.12), supporting the idea that the themes were not redundant. Table 1 shows the frequency of 
each theme by condition. Most-me (vs. least-me) narratives were more likely to involve: (a) fun, 
amusement, or excitement; (b) achievement or success; (c) a return to familiar people, places, or 
activities; (d) spending time with close others, but not doing anything in particular; (e) helping 
someone; and (f) being creative. Least-me (vs. most-me) narratives were more likely to involve: 
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(a) reacting to a negative or difficult event; (b) the feeling of being evaluated by others; (c) 
demonstrating (a lack of) social competence; (d) feeling isolated; (e) failing one’s own standards; 
(f) doing as others expect or the situation demands; (g) trying something new; (h) failing the 
standards of others; and (i) feeling ill. The narrative conditions did not differ with respect to 
engaging in contemplation or experiencing bereavement.  
As Table 2 shows, raters perceived a difference between most-me and least-me events with 
respect to the presence of all emotion clusters except surprise/amazement/astonishment. Most-
me events were more likely to contain the positive emotion clusters, least-me events the negative 
emotion clusters. Contentment was the emotional hallmark of authenticity experiences, whereas 
anxiety was the emotional hallmark of inauthenticity experiences. 
Table 2 shows the frequency of perceived need satisfaction by narrative condition. Least-
me narratives were not seen to have fulfilled any need. Most-me narratives, in contrast, were 
seen to have fulfilled all needs – especially self-esteem and relatedness, then autonomy – except 
for money/luxury. The raters also perceived the writers of most-me narratives as having 
presented a significantly more idealistic version of themselves than did writers of the least-me 
narratives (Table 2), suggesting potential overlap between real and ideal selves. 
Below we present narratives that typify the content of most-me experiences: 
I felt most myself when my boyfriend told me that he loved me. I finally felt I could express myself 
fully around him and that I had nothing to prove. I was in my flat in the kitchen making tea. I felt 
I could say I loved him too without hesitation and would not feel embarrassed or awkward or 
wish I had not said it.      
After sixth form one day we went down to the mill pond [...] in Cambridge and we rented a punt-
boat, and went down the river for a couple of hours and moored up and had a bbq and drinks. I 
was with my girlfriend and three best friends and we stayed there late drinking, chilling out, and 
talking about our lives and childhoods. I was really happy at that moment in life and felt relaxed, 
honest and that nothing else mattered or would ever change.  
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The narratives below illustrate the content and phenomenology of least-me experiences: 
In my adult life, the time [...] I felt least like myself was my first official day at university. 
Although I went to lectures with a few people I knew from school, the environment was 
completely unknown and I felt out of my depth. The buildings were unrecognizable as were the 
people. I felt as though I was alone and had lost my sense of self.  
I was at the company headquarters, waiting in the reception area. I was taken by the receptionist 
to an upstairs room. I entered the room to find two men sitting behind a table. [...] I felt very 
nervous, aware that I had to put on a good performance, to exaggerate my skills otherwise I 
would have no chance of landing the job. The two men took it in turns to ask me questions and I 
had to think quickly to construct a convincing answer without freezing up completely and my 
mind going blank due to [...] trying to be someone else [...] super-confident, most unlike the 
reserved and modest Scot that I was.                                                                                                                                            
Moderation by Trait Authenticity 
To examine whether trait authenticity moderated the above results, we subjected the theme, 
emotion, and need ratings to logistic binary regression analysis. Each theme (n = 17), emotion (n 
= 11), and need (n = 10) served as the dependent variable in a logistic regression in which 
narrative condition, trait authenticity (represented by the relevant standardized scale), and the 
Condition × Trait Authenticity interactions were predictors. When idealistic portrayal served as 
the dependent variable, the relevant analyses were performed using linear regression. In the 
analyses involving AI, participant age (standardized) was a covariate. 
 If the experience of authenticity — or inauthenticity — differs as a function of one’s 
standing on trait authenticity, we would expect to find significant Condition × Trait Authenticity 
interactions. If, on the other hand, there is commonality as to how state authenticity is 
experienced, then trait authenticity will not moderate the experience of state (in)authenticity. 
Authenticity Inventory. There were only two significant narrative Condition × Trait 
Authenticity interactions across the 39 codings [all else: Wald χ2 < 3.30, p > .05, or t(128) = .26, 
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p = .80 ]: (a) Theme─Achievement: Wald χ2 = 4.12, p = .042, Exp[B] = .30; and (b) 
Emotion─Contentment: Wald χ2 = 5.11, p = .024, Exp[B] = .16.  
Authentic Personality. For the AP, there also were only two significant narrative 
Condition × Trait Authenticity interactions across the 39 codings (all else: Wald χ2 < 3.50, p > 
.05, or t(121) = -.51, p = .61): (a) Theme─ Familiarity: Wald χ2 = 4.8,  p = .027, Exp[B] = 2.94; 
and (b) Emotion─Love/Compassion/ Affection: Wald χ2 = 4.09, p = .043, Exp[B] = 5.16.  
Summary 
Having fun, engaging in familiar activities, striving for achievement, and hanging out were 
important themes in most-me experiences. Dominant themes of least-me experiences included 
unpleasant challenges (awkward social, isolated, or difficult situations) as well as situations in 
which one’s own or another’s expectations or standards were salient and, perhaps, unmet. Most-
me situations were mainly characterized by low arousal positive emotions (in particular, 
contentment, calmness). Least-me experiences were exclusively characterized by negative 
emotions, predominantly anxiety but also low arousal emotions (e.g., disappointment, sadness). 
Also, most-me situations involved high levels of satisfaction of both self-esteem and relatedness 
needs, and real-self situations shared some characteristics with ideal-self situations. Trait 
authenticity qualified only two narrative condition effects for each scale. Thus, state 
(in)authenticity is experientially similar for people, no matter their dispositional authenticity. 
STUDY 3  
Study 3 aimed to replicate the findings of Study 2 and examine subjective perceptions of 
most-me and least-me events. Participants wrote about and then rated their own narrative of a 
most- or least-me event with respect to situational affect, need satisfaction, ideal-self overlap, 
self-esteem, and public/private self-consciousness. Thus, in addition to testing the relation 
between real and ideal self in greater detail, we conducted a more focused assessment of the role 
of self-esteem, given its theorized and observed associations with trait and state authenticity 
(Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Heppner et al., 2008). Also, we assessed directly the subjective 
experience of situational private and public self-consciousness, in light of Study 2’s finding 
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concerning the role of social context in (in)authenticity as well as theorizing concerning the 
purported relation between authenticity and each public (Bargh et al., 2002; Turner & Billings, 
1991) and private (Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Koole & Kuhl, 2003) self-consciousness. As in 
Study 2, the narratives were coded by external raters to identify key experiential themes. Finally, 
this study examined the consequences of recalling a past instance of (in)authenticity for one’s 
current emotions. Can brief experiences of authenticity yield benefits beyond that moment?  
Method 
Participants 
We tested 108 online volunteers. We excluded those who did not submit a narrative 
alongside their ratings (n = 11) or submitted a too-brief or irrelevant narrative (n = 4). Of the 
remaining 93 participants, 69 were women and 21 were men (3 unreported), ranging in age 
between 18 and 61 years (M = 30.94, SD = 12.77).  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants first wrote about one of two types of situations: Approximately half (n = 45) 
described an event during which “you felt most like your true or real self,” whereas the other 
half (n = 48) described an event during which “you felt least like your true or real self." Next, 
participants rated the event using modified forms of the following scales (1 = strongly disagree, 
7 = strongly agree): (a) short-form Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Kercher, 1992); (b) Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965); and (c) private and public 
self-consciousness scales (Fenigstein, Seheier, & Buss, 1975). The focal modification of these 
scales centered on asking participants to rate their psychological state (e.g., state self-esteem) in 
that specific situation. Participants also rated their narrative on the extent to which the experience 
aligned with their ideal self (10 attributes from the Self-Attributes Questionnaire; Pelham & 
Swann, 1989) and on the extent to which each of 10 psychological needs were satisfied during 
the event (one item per need; Sheldon et al., 2001). All scales had high internal consistency: 
positive affect (PA; α = .88); negative affect (NA; α = .89); state self-esteem (SE; α = .95), state 
private self-consciousness (PriSC; α = .87); state public self -consciousness (PubSC; α = .94); 
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situational ideal self (ISelf; α = .89); and situational need satisfaction (NSat; α = .90). Finally, 
participants rated their current affective state: (a) When you reflect on this experience now, how 
do you feel? (1 = low/negative, 7 = up/positive); (b) Do you feel nostalgic about the time you 
described? (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The survey concluded with demographic items. 
Coding experiential content. Three of a sample of MTurk raters (N = 68; Mage = 34.99, 
SDage = 12.01; 60% female; 96% native English speakers; 93% with university-level 
coursework) were randomly assigned to rate each narrative with respect to 17 themes (as in 
Study 2). The MTurk raters did not code for emotions and need satisfaction; instead, participants 
made their own ratings of these and other variables. Absolute agreement across themes (where 
all three raters gave the same code) was common (M = 47.4%) and exceeded chance (12.5%).1 
 Results and Discussion 
Experiential Content 
Themes. Reinforcing the idea that the themes are not redundant, the average Spearman 
correlation among them was again small (rs = .15, SD = .12). Table 1 shows the frequency of 
each theme by condition. Narratives in the most-me (vs. least-me) condition were more likely to 
involve: (a) returning to familiar places, people, or activities; (b) hanging out; (c) achievement; 
(d) creativity (though only marginally so); and (e) fun. Least-me (vs. most-me) narratives, on the 
other hand, were more likely to involve: (a) the pressure of others’ expectations; (b) the feeling 
of being evaluated by others; (c) failing one’s own standards; (d) failing someone else’s 
standards; (e) feeling isolated; (f) feeling ill; and (g) experiencing bereavement (marginally). The 
most-me and least-me narratives did not differ with respect to: (a) trying something new; (b) 
contemplation; (c) sociality; and (d) helping someone.  
Participants’ ratings. Table 3 shows the mean values and statistical comparisons between 
least-me and most-me narratives for participants’ ratings. Most-me narratives, on average, were 
                                                 
1 We are also confident about the MTurk codings, because they correlated in meaningful ways with 
participants’ own ratings of the events; analyses available upon request. 
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associated with significantly greater positive affect, lesser negative affect, greater self-esteem, 
lesser public and private self-consciousness, a more ideal self (except concerning athletic 
ability), and greater need satisfaction (except concerning money/luxury) than were least-me 
narratives. Clearly, most-me experiences feel better than least-me experiences. Reflecting on 
these events at a later date made participants in the most-me condition feel more positive and 
more nostalgic than those in the least-me condition. 
To assess which emotions were more critical to most-me and least-me situations, we 
compared each positive affect attribute to the average PA, and each negative affect attribute to 
the average NA, for the relevant condition. In the most-me condition, none of the PA attributes 
were significantly different from the condition’s average PA (all ps > .50). There was only one 
marginal comparison among the NA attributes for participants in the most-me condition: They 
were somewhat more nervous in comparison to any other negative emotion, t(44) = 1. 97, p = 
.056 (all other ps > .30). For the least-me condition, participants’ nervousness was significantly 
greater than the other negative attributes, t(45) = 2.28, p = .028, whereas their self-reported fear 
was marginally lower than the other negative attributes, t(47) = -1.70, p = .096. With respect to 
the PA attributes, all were either marginally [determined: t(47) = 1.88, p = .067] or significantly 
different from the average PA in the least-me condition, ts(47) > |2.10|, ps < .040. Feelings of 
alertness and determination were higher than average, whereas feelings of inspiration, 
excitement, and enthusiasm were lower than average. 
To determine which ideal-self attributes were critical to each state, we compared the mean 
overlap between the situation and the ideal self for each attribute to the average across all 
attributes for each condition separately. Among participants in the most-me condition, the 
greatest overlap with the ideal self occurred with respect to intellect, t(44) = 2.70, p = .010, 
common sense, t(44) = 3.41, p = .001, and humor, t(44) = 2.22, p = .032, whereas the least 
overlap with the ideal self occurred with respect to artistic abilities, t(43) = -2.13, p = .039, and 
athletic abilities, t(44) = -4.15, p = .001. The other attributes (social competence, physical 
attractiveness, leadership, emotional stability, and self-discipline) were not significantly different 
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from the condition mean (all ps > .14). Among participants in the least-me condition, none of the 
attributes differed significantly from the overall attribute mean (all ps > .26). 
We conducted a similar analysis to assess which needs were most likely to be fulfilled in 
each condition. Among participants in the most-me condition, the needs most likely to be 
satisfied were autonomy, t(44) = 6.23, p = .001, pleasure, t(44) = 2.25, p = .030, and self-esteem, 
t(44) = 3.74, p = .001, with the need for relatedness also being marginally greater than the 
average need satisfaction in this condition, t(44) = 1.86, p = .070. The other needs (competence, 
meaning, physical thriving, security, and popularity/influence) were not significantly different 
from the overall mean for this condition (all ps > .14). Among participants in the least-me 
condition, the needs least likely to be satisfied were the needs for physical thriving, t(46) = -2.75, 
p = .008, and pleasure, t(46) = -2.06, p = .045. The other eight needs were not significantly 
different from the overall mean for this condition (all ps > .19). 
Summary 
As in Study 2, most-me experiences involved fun, hanging out with others, familiar settings, 
or achievement. In contrast, least-me experiences were characterized by a sense of having (and, 
perhaps, failing) to meet certain expectations, feeling judged, facing difficult situations or 
experiencing isolation. Self-ratings confirmed the independent coders’ perceptions in the 
previous study: Most-me (vs. least-me) narratives were associated with more positive and less 
negative affect, higher self-esteem, lesser self-consciousness (both public and private), stronger 
overlap with the ideal self (especially in the domains of intellect, common sense, and humor), 
and greater need satisfaction (especially of autonomy, pleasure, and self-esteem). Subsequent 
reflection upon most-me (vs. least-me) experiences induced positive mood and nostalgia.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Written reference to authenticity hearkens back to the Greek philosophers (Harter, 2002) and 
the seeds of psychological interest in this concept were planted in our field’s earliest days 
(Vannini & Franzese, 2008). Despite authenticity remaining a central topic of interest among 
modern psychologists (researchers and practitioners) as well as among the general population, 
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the concept remains relatively amorphous. Kernis and Goldman (2006) suggested that the 
confusion surrounding authenticity’s meaning may be due not only to the plethora of available 
definitions, but also to the possibility that the concept is at the very “limits of language” (p. 284). 
Our research shows, however, that people can indeed put words to this experience and, further, 
that by examining those words, one acquires an ecologically valid understanding of how people 
experience authenticity. Accordingly, the present research provides a more solid basis for future 
theorizing regarding the triggers, content and, ultimately, functions of state authenticity. 
Relevance of State (In)Authenticity 
Study 1 showed that feelings of authenticity and inauthenticity vary within people and, 
further, that such variations are commonplace. On average, the feeling of authenticity occurs at 
least weekly, whereas the feeling of inauthenticity occurs every other month. Over 88% of the 
sample reported feelings of both authenticity and inauthenticity. Further, the frequencies of these 
two types of experiences were only weakly inversely related. Finally, feeling either authentic or 
inauthentic is not the default state. The default state would seem to be feeling neither one way 
nor the other. Instead, state (in)authenticity is just that: a temporary experiential phenomenon 
brought to the fore by situational factors. These results accord with those of Fleeson and Wilt 
(2010), who found that authenticity fluctuates more within than between people. 
    Participants reported strong motivations regarding state (in)authenticity: They wanted to 
experience authenticity and avoid inauthenticity. Motivation does not necessarily translate, 
however, into an ability to control the frequency of these experiences. Motivation seems 
insufficient to avoid state inauthenticity especially, suggesting that this state ─ more so than state 
authenticity ─ may be driven by factors outside the individual’s control. 
Experiential Content of State (In)Authenticity 
Why do people seek to experience authenticity and avoid inauthenticity? According to 
Erickson (1995), emotions are central to the experience of (in)authenticity. Studies 1 and 2 
confirm that the “emotional ambience” of authenticity is largely positive, whereas for 
inauthenticity it is largely negative (Heppner et al., 2008; Rice & Pasupathi, 2010; Turner & 
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Billings, 1991): State authenticity feels relatively good, and state inauthenticity feels relatively 
bad. Framing the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity only in terms of experiential 
valence, however, would be an oversimplification.   
Authenticity. Study 2 pinpointed the emotions associated with feeling “real”: 
Contentment/satisfaction/enjoyment was the most important emotion prototype, followed by 
calmness/relaxation/relief, enthusiasm/excitement/enthrallment, and love/compassion/affection. 
Notably, these are primarily low-arousal, positive emotions (Shaver et al., 1987).  
Findings concerning the experiential themes and needs satisfied offer an account for the 
predominance of these emotions in state authenticity. In most-me events, Fun was the most 
frequently identified theme, followed by Familiarity, Sociality, Hanging out, and Achievement. 
Themes such as Bereavement, Illness, Failing one’s own or others’ standards were rarely 
observed. The needs that were most likely to be satisfied in authenticity experiences were self-
esteem, autonomy, relatedness, and pleasure. Study 2 also suggested that most-me experiences 
satisfy the need for competence, with a relatively high incidence of the Achievement theme 
across Studies 2 and 3 corroborating the relevance of competence to authenticity. 
Taken together, a feeling of contentment and comfort with oneself and with others, when 
combined with a sense of one’s own individuality (autonomy) and competence, are indicative of 
authenticity. This supports SDT’s (Deci & Ryan, 2000) premise that satisfaction of the needs for 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness facilitate authenticity. Leary (2003), for different 
reasons, also theorized that the experience of authenticity depends on the satisfaction of the need 
for relatedness, so long as it is achieved through autonomous means. The results are consistent 
with this theorizing too. Neither perspective directly addresses the role of self-esteem needs in 
the experience of authenticity, though it can be inferred from sociometer theory. Studies 2 and 3 
demonstrated that satisfaction of self-esteem needs coincides with the sense of authenticity. 
The important role of self-esteem in facilitating an authentic state is bolstered by findings 
concerning the ideal self: In Study 3, participants in the most-me (vs. least-me) condition rated 
their experience as having greater overlap with their ideal self for nine out of ten attributes. 
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Activation of the ideal self may, ironically, make people feel “real.” If so, the experience of state 
authenticity could, in part, reflect self-enhancement biases (Swann, 1990). Or people have 
internalized ideal-self standards as part of their real self (Sherman et al., 2012). A third 
possibility is that feeling “real” contributes to feeling ideal; that is, activation of the ideal self 
follows from experiencing oneself as ‘real.’ The theme analyses showing that relatively mundane 
(rather than extraordinary) activities such as “hanging out” and returning to “familiar” places are 
strongly associated with authenticity bolster the latter interpretation.  
Neither SDT (Deci & Ryan, 2000) nor Leary (2003) posit that satisfaction of the need for 
pleasure is important for authenticity; our results suggest otherwise. That is, positive affect may 
not merely be an outcome of authenticity (Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Heppner et al., 2008; Wood 
et al., 2008); it may also be a precursor. Consistent with this contention, Fleeson and Wilt’s 
(2010) experimental studies showed that increasing positive and decreasing negative affect 
predicted increasing state authenticity.  
As described previously, Fleeson and Wilt (2010) also found that people who behaved in 
an extraverted, agreeable, conscientious, emotionally stable, or open way felt authentic, no 
matter their actual standing on these traits. Situations in which one is behaving extravertedly, 
agreeably, openly (etc.) are reminiscent of those in which needs for relatedness, autonomy, 
competence, self-esteem, and pleasure have been satisfied. That is, situations in which these 
needs have been met afford expression of these personality traits. Thus, it is not necessary, for 
example, that an introvert’s true-self concept comprises extraversion (Sherman et al., 2012).  
Ultimately, although our studies identified several needs closely associated with 
authenticity (self-esteem, autonomy, relatedness, pleasure, competence), they do not tell us 
which are necessary or sufficient to produce this experience. Additionally, whereas the results 
show that satisfaction of the need for money/luxury was infrequently observed, this does not 
necessarily mean that the less-frequent needs were unsatisfied; it could mean that the need is 
irrelevant. Experimental work is needed. 
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Some researchers have theorized that heightened private self-awareness is related to 
authenticity (Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Koole & Kuhl, 2003; Wood et al., 2008), whereas others 
have implied that an absence of self-awareness may be more conducive to authenticity (Turner & 
Billings, 1991). The current results support neither hypothesis; or both. On average, private self-
consciousness was at the scale mid-point, suggesting that authenticity experiences involve 
neither high nor low private self-consciousness. Alternatively, the middling score may reflect an 
averaging across a bimodal distribution of low and high private self-consciousness. Supporting 
the latter proposition, exploratory cluster analyses of participants' ratings in Study 3 suggest that, 
indeed, there may be significant and meaningful phenomenological variability within these 
experiences; that is, there may be common subtype patterns of experience that averaging cannot 
capture.2 Accordingly, future research should investigate this prospect further.  
Inauthenticity. Harter (2002) posited that inauthenticity manifests as “psychological 
tension” (p. 383). Supporting and extending this description, Study 2 showed that feeling untrue 
was associated with anxiety/unease/tension/stress, followed by 
disappointment/dismay/discouragement, sadness/depression/shame/loneliness, and 
anger/irritation/disgust/envy/frustration. Anxiety is thus the signature emotion of least-me 
experiences. Indeed, anxiety was observed in nearly 90% of the event descriptions and public 
self-consciousness was uniformly high. Anxiety is negative in valence and high in arousal. Thus, 
per a circumplex model of affective space, the experiences of authenticity and of inauthenticity 
can be perceived as opposites (Russell, 2003).  
In the least-me events, Facing difficulty was the most-frequently noted experiential theme, 
followed by Feeling judged, Doing as expected, Isolation, and (Failing) own or others’ 
standards. Need satisfaction was extremely low across the board. The needs least likely to be 
satisfied ─ as perceived by the MTurk raters (Study 2) and by the participants themselves (Study 
3) ─ included pleasure, physical thriving, and money/luxury. Together, the results concerning 
                                                 
2 The cluster analyses results are not presented here due to space constraints, but are available upon request.  
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themes and need satisfaction indicate that failure to have the need for pleasure satisfied is at the 
heart of the inauthenticity experience.  
Additionally, public self-consciousness is critical to the production of inauthenticity, as 
evidenced by participants' high ratings of this construct. Furthermore, the narratives commonly 
referred to feeling the judgment, scrutiny, or evaluation of others or following the expectations of 
others. Indeed, in some of the descriptions, and as per Leary’s (2003) contention, being 
concerned with others’ evaluations and needs may have been done in the service of achieving 
popularity/influence (and, ultimately, self-esteem); but ─ by and large ─ inauthentic events are 
those in which such attempts meet with failure. This claim is supported by the gap between the 
frequency of the themes Feeling judged and Expectations compared with the frequency of 
satisfaction of the need for popularity/influence. We thus suggest that it is high levels of public 
exposure coupled with experiencing difficulties or negative affect that produces inauthenticity.  
Authenticity versus inauthenticity. Is the experience of authenticity the simple 
converse of inauthenticity? While there is clear support for this notion (state authenticity is 
associated with low-arousal positive emotions, greater need satisfaction, and higher ideal-self 
overlap, whereas state inauthenticity is associated with a high-arousal negative emotion, lesser 
need satisfaction, and lower ideal-self overlap), they share some characteristics. First, they are 
both social experiences. We are reminded of the philosophical conundrum concerning trees 
falling in forests and whether they make a sound if no one is there to hear it (attributed to George 
Berkeley, 1685-1753). Similarly, people largely do not feel authentic (or inauthentic) unless 
another is present. Second, both experiences involve a modicum of private self-consciousness. In 
the case of authenticity, self-consciousness may emanate from communicating about the self to 
accepting others (Lopez & Rice, 2006), whereas its presence in inauthenticity may follow from 
interacting with judging others. Indeed, for both experiences, private and public self-
consciousness are positively correlated (r = .48 and .41, respectively, both ps < .01). 
Prescriptive Versus Experiential Authenticity 
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We would like to highlight a distinction within state authenticity between what can be 
experienced subjectively versus prescriptions concerning how to achieve it. Prescriptions 
concerning authenticity are criteria that must be fulfilled for an individual or behavior to be 
deemed "authentic". These criteria include value- or trait-behavior consistency, self-awareness, 
rejection of external influence, unbiased processing of one’s attributes, and openness and honesty 
with others (Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Sheldon & Elliot, 1998; Wood et al., 2008). Recent 
research, however, suggests a dissociation between experiential and prescriptive state 
authenticity. For example, people who temporarily behave in an agreeable, extroverted, 
conscientious, stable, and open manner — regardless of their actual traits — feel more authentic 
(Fleeson & Wilt, 2010; Sheldon et al., 1997). Additional recent findings indicate that simply 
being primed with power makes people feel more authentic (Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). If 
this dissociation exists more generally, it would be a mistake to draw inferences about the 
subjective experience of authenticity from the observed success or failure to meet prescriptive 
criteria. That is, the subjective experience of authenticity need not follow from fulfillment of the 
prescriptive criteria and, conversely, the experience of inauthenticity need not follow from 
failure to fulfill these criteria.  
For example, the results of our studies offer little support for the idea that either deep 
awareness or unbiased processing of one’s attributes play a role in experiential authenticity. With 
respect to the former prescriptive criterion, private self-consciousness was only moderately 
strong in experiences of state authenticity. Also, there was little evidence in the narratives’ 
content that people were assimilating contradictions within themselves, as there was significant 
overlap between the real and ideal selves. Although the least-me narratives showed that the 
feeling of inauthenticity often arises from the failure to meet one’s own standards (a value-
behavior violation), the most-me narratives rarely described instances of people behaving in 
accord with their core values. For instance, benevolence is a value that is held strongly by most 
people (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), but very few most-me narratives described instances of 
helping others. Thus, while prescriptions concerning relational orientation, rejection of external 
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influence, and violations of value-behavior consistency (for inauthenticity) possess some 
ecological validity, there is a discrepancy between these experiences and prescriptions 
concerning awareness, unbiased processing, and value-behavior consistency (for authenticity).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although we used an experimental design to examine the similarities and disparities 
between the experiences of authenticity and inauthenticity, the conclusions we have drawn are 
correlational. As such, the causal order of events remains uncertain. Do feelings of authenticity 
follow from positive affect or vice versa? Does satisfaction of the need for self-esteem mediate 
the relationship between relatedness satisfaction and state authenticity? Future research should 
take advantage of experimental designs to isolate the causes, co-actors, and consequences of 
state authenticity. It is conceivable that there is a self-reinforcing loop between some of the 
constructs (e.g., positive mood increases authenticity which, in turn, yields positive mood). 
The retrospective nature of the narrative methodology also constitutes a limitation, as the 
narratives may not accurately reflect people’s in situ experiences. Attributions of one’s past 
emotions, thoughts, and behavior to the “real me” may be a function of reconstructive memory 
processes, which are known to be fallible both generally (Loftus & Palmer, 1974) and 
specifically regarding recollection of one’s past emotions (Levine, 1997) and past behaviors 
(Gramzow & Willard, 2006). Although memory for experiences of (in)authenticity is an 
interesting phenomenon, it is important to know if and how these feelings arise in the moment.  
A third limitation is reliance on participants from Western, educated, industrialized, rich, 
and democratic (WEIRD) societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). As Henrich et al. 
(2010) noted, self-enhancement biases are less common amongst East Asians (vs. Westerners) 
and autonomy of choice is less valued and prevalent in non-Western nations. Participants were 
also primarily young adults. It is possible that middle-age or older adults would report at least 
somewhat different experiences of (in)authenticity, as people tend to become more assertive, 
agreeable, and emotionally stable with age (Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008). Accordingly, future 
research should determine if our results generalize to different cultures and ages.  
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Coda 
Authenticity and inauthenticity are common experiences that people are eager to seek out (the 
former) or avoid (the latter). The experience of authenticity centers on contentment and social 
ease; or, in the case of inauthenticity, a lack thereof plus anxiety. Reflecting on these experiences 
evokes positive mood and nostalgia. The present findings demonstrate that state authenticity is 
separable from trait authenticity and, further, that the experience of state authenticity does not 
wholly map on to prescriptions as to what should make people feel (in)authentic. 
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Table 1 
Studies 2-3: Narrative Theme Frequency by Narrative Condition. 
 
Label 
Study 2 
Most me       Least me 
 Study 3 
Most me       Least me 
Fun 58.3a% 11.2b%  40.0a% 8.3b% 
Familiarity 53.4a% 19.4b%  35.6a% 8.3b% 
Contemplation 51.5a% 55.3a%  13.3a% 12.5a% 
Achievement 46.3a% 9.2b%  37.8a% 2.1b% 
Sociality 45.9a% 70.5b%  33.3a% 27.1a% 
Hanging out 43.6a% 29.1b%  35.6a% 8.3b% 
Novelty 31.3a% 43.3b%  24.4a% 25.0a% 
Doing as expected 18.8a% 50.4b%  8.9a% 43.8b% 
Feeling judged 16.5a% 73.7b%  8.9a% 52.1b% 
Helping 15.7a% 4.5b%  22.2a% 10.4a% 
Creativity 15.3a% 3.0b%  6.7a†% 0.0a% 
Facing difficulty 12.7a% 75.4b%  17.8a% 70.8b% 
Isolation 6.8a% 53.0b%  6.7a% 39.6b% 
(Failing) others’ 
standards 
5.3a% 37.6b%  0.0a% 22.9b% 
(Failing) own 
standards 
5.2a% 49.6b%  2.2a% 25.0b% 
Illness 1.5a% 6.7b%  2.2a% 14.6b% 
Bereavement 0.7a% 3.0a%  0.0a†% 6.3a% 
Note. Within a row for Studies 1 and 2 separately, frequencies with different subscripts are 
significantly different from one another at p < .05. The symbol † denotes frequencies that differ 
at p < .10. Themes ordered by Study 2 most-me descending frequency. 
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Table 2 
Study 2: Comparisons of Emotion Cluster Frequency, Need Satisfaction Frequency, and 
Idealistic Portrayal Rating Mean (SD) by Narrative Condition. 
        Most me                   Least me 
Emotion clusters 
 
Contentment/ satisfaction/ enjoyment 
Calmness/relaxation/relief 
Enthusiasm/excitement/enthrallment 
Love/compassion/affection 
Pride/triumph 
Anxiety/unease/tension/stress 
Surprise/amazement/astonishment 
Sadness/depression/shame/loneliness 
Anger/irritation/disgust/envy/frustration 
Disappointment/dismay/discouragement 
Fear/alarm 
 
 
91.0a% 
67.2a% 
65.7a% 
56.5a% 
53.4a% 
11.9a% 
11.3a% 
7.5a% 
4.5a% 
3.7a% 
3.7a% 
 
6.0b% 
3.0b% 
5.2b% 
5.2b% 
6.0b% 
88.8b% 
6.8 a% 
64.9b% 
56.0b% 
66.2b% 
33.6b% 
Need satisfaction 
 
Self-esteem 
Relatedness 
Autonomy 
Competence 
Pleasure/stimulation 
Security 
Meaning 
Popularity/influence 
Physical thriving 
Money/luxury 
Idealistic portrayal 
 
 
85.8a% 
78.2a% 
68.9a% 
60.4a% 
59.2a% 
58.6a% 
55.3a% 
42.1a% 
15.8a% 
5.3a% 
     3.84a (.70) 
 
14.3b% 
16.7b% 
15.7b% 
13.4b% 
2.3b% 
9.0b% 
7.5b% 
13.5b% 
3.0b% 
3.0a% 
     2.45b (.82) 
Note. Within a row, frequencies (or means) with different subscripts are significantly different at 
p < .05. Emotion clusters and needs ordered by most-me descending frequency. 
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Table 3 
Study 3: Means (SD) and Independent T-Test Comparisons of Most-Me and Least-Me Narrative 
Ratings. 
 
 Most me Least me 
Positive affect 
Inspired 
Enthusiastic 
Excited 
Alert 
Determined 
              5.54a (.98) 
5.62a (1.21) 
  5.62a (1.60) 
5.53a (1.55) 
5.53a (1.44) 
5.40a (1.44) 
 
3.11b (1.40) 
2.25b (1.73) 
  2.56b (1.74) 
2.52b (1.75) 
4.54b (1.62) 
3.67b (2.06) 
Negative affect  
Nervous 
Distressed 
Upset 
Scared 
Afraid 
2.39a (1.43) 
2.98a (1.94) 
  2.40a (1.94) 
  2.18a (1.83) 
  2.24a (1.71)  
  2.16a (1.65) 
4.28b (1.57) 
4.91b (1.98) 
  4.56b (1.90) 
  4.42b (1.89) 
  3.77b (2.18) 
  3.73b (2.12) 
Private situational self-
consciousness 
4.02a (1.48) 4.81b (1.31) 
Public situational self-
consciousness 
2.87a (2.07) 5.31b (1.78) 
Self-esteem 6.20b (.92) 3.83a (1.52) 
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Overall ideal self 
 
            Common sense 
Intellectual 
Sense of humor 
Leadership 
Social competence 
Emotional stability 
Self-discipline 
Physical attractiveness 
Artistic 
Athletics 
5.44a (.95) 
 
 6.07a (1.21) 
  5.91a (1.15) 
5.91a (1.40) 
5.82a (1.63) 
5.73a (1.59) 
5.42a (1.66) 
5.22a (1.76) 
5.13a (1.60) 
4.91a (1.68) 
4.29a (1.88) 
3.98b (1.42) 
 
4.23b (2.16) 
  4.26b (2.29) 
4.02b (2.11) 
3.57b (2.26) 
3.64b (2.06) 
3.77b (1.98) 
3.98b (2.02) 
4.00b (1.91) 
3.78b (2.13) 
3.61b (1.87) 
Overall need satisfaction 
 
Autonomy 
Self-esteem 
Pleasure/stimulation 
Relatedness 
Meaning 
Competence 
Physical thriving 
Popularity/influence 
Security 
Money/luxury 
              5.09a (.90) 
 
6.29a (1.29) 
5.87a (1.39) 
5.71a (1.85) 
5.60a (1.84) 
5.18a (1.76) 
5.09a (1.92) 
4.84a (2.03) 
4.73a (1.84) 
4.69a (1.79) 
2.87a (2.05) 
2.60b (1.19) 
 
2.40b (1.84) 
2.94b (2.11) 
2.15b (1.50) 
2.89b (2.10) 
2.60b (2.08) 
2.89b (2.11) 
2.09b (1.28)  
2.85b (1.92) 
2.91b (2.11) 
2.32a (1.45) 
Upon reflection 
 
Mood positivity  
Nostalgia 
 
6.18a (1.34) 
5.05a (1.93) 
3.04b (1.77) 
2.46b (1.90) 
Note. Within a row, means with different subscripts are significantly different from one another 
at p < .05. Positive affect attributes, ideal-self attributes, and needs ordered by most-me 
descending means; negative affect attributes ordered by least-me descending means. 
 
 
